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The Rôle of Unions in Inflation 
A Survey Article 
C.G. Williams 
Wide divergence ofviews exists on the power of unions to in-
fluence the gênerai wage level. This paper contrasts selected 
views. A modified Trevithick/Mulvey classification of union re-
action to escess demand for labour is used to classify writers. A 
second part examines questions of union power and militancy. 
Since the early 1970s interest has been rekindled in the question of the 
rôle of unions in inflation. It is an important question particularly in view 
of the secular acceleration^f price and wage increases over the last twenty-
five years. The answers vary widely both in the estimate of the rôle and in 
the complexity of approach. An example of a simple approach may be seen 
in the way in which Michael Wachter ends his appraisal and discussion of a 
complex article by Daniel Mitchell on "Union Wage Détermination: Policy 
Implications and Outlook": 
"I see little évidence in this paper to support an argument that unions are a source of 
today's inflation problem. In the early 1960s the average inflation rate was approxi-
mately 1.5 percent. Today, the 'built-in' inflation rate appears to be approximately 7 
percent. Are labor unions stronger today than they were in the 1950s and 1960s? 
What is the mechanism through which they hâve somehow managed to boost the in-
flation rate? 
In the political arena, labor unions hâve lost as many battles as they hâve won in the 
past few years. The defeat of the labor reform bill of 1978 is an important indicator 
of the political strength of unions... (I)f a 'threat effect' exists (in the nonunion sec-
tor) from the unionized sector... it was stronger in the noninflationary 1950s than in 
the inflationary 1970s."1 
The apparent self-evident truth of thèse remarks did not end the discus-
sion. One reason for this is that there are equally simple and intuitively ap-
pealing arguments supporting the contrary position. In almost every year 
* WILLIAMS, C.G., Professor of Economies, University of South Carolina, Colum-
bia, S.C. 
** The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of an anonymous reviewer 
for this Journal. 
1 Daniel J.B. MITCHELL, "Union Wage Détermination: Policy Implications Out-
look", Brookings Papers on Economie Activity 3, 1978, pp. 588-9. 
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since 1959, when data first became available, médian union wage adjust-
ments hâve exceeded those of nonunion establishments, and in every year 
they hâve exceeded average increases in labor productivity2. This must give 
some a priori basis for believing that union workers fare better on average 
than nonunion workers and that they hâve access to a power source which 
provides a continuai growing advantage relative to the nonunion work-
force. The OECD Expert Group investigating the problem of rising priées 
concluded in 1961 that "any study of how the labor market has operated 
leaves no reasonable doubt that something besides market forces was at 
work."3 This conclusion was based however on indirect évidence, namely, 
the lack of corrélation between changes in wages by industry and changes in 
employment, the stability of the wage structure, the downward inflexibility 
of wages, and the size of wage increases. Analysis might therefore inhibit 
certainty, but it seems clear that the simple conclusions can be dangerously 
deceptive. 
Union membership in the United States is today at an all-time high. 
United States membership in national unions in 1978 reached 23,307,000, 
distributed among 174 unions and 34 employée associations. There were 
also 374,000 members in single-firm and local unaffiliated unions, and 
235,000 members in municipal employée associations4. In total, union 
membership as a percentage of nonagricultural employment stood at 24.0. 
When association membership is included, this figure becomes 27.1 per-
cent5. 
The incidence of union membership and of collective bargaining cover-
age varies among geographical areas and industrial sectors. In 1978 union 
members as a percent of employées in nonagricultural establishments rang-
ed from 39.2 percent in New York State to 6.5 percent in North Carolina6. 
In coal and métal mining, construction, transportation and public utilities 
most wage earners are union members. Some 75 percent of production and 
non-supervisory workers in manufacturing are employed in union establish-
ments, accounting for roughly one half of ail workers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements in the private sector7. However, parts of manufac-
2 U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1980 and Current Wage 
Developments, 32, 5, May 1981. 
3 W. FELLNER et al., The Problem of Rising Priées, Paris, OECD 1961, p. 48. 
4 U.S. Department of Labor Directory of National Unions and Employées Associa-
tions, 1979, BLS Bulletion No. 2079, September 1980, Table 5, p. 47. 
5 Ibid., Table 5, p. 59. 
6 Ibid., Table 18, p. 71. 
7 U.S. Congress, Joint Economie Committee, "Union and Non-Union Changes, 
1959-1972" by Martin ESTEV. Price and Wage Control: An Evaluation of Current Policies, 
Hearings before the Joint Economie Committee, 92nd Congress, 1972, p. 323. 
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turing, in particular, textiles, are only slightly unionized. In trade, service 
industries, state and local governments, finance and insurance, and agricul-
ture unionism is generally weak, though hère again there is considerably 
variation by géographie région. 
Opinions vary on whether the extent of unionism and of collective bar-
gaining coverage in the United States is extensive or insignificant. John 
Dunlop or Otto Eckstein would probably say that the union impact is sub-
stantial. A sizeable portion of économie activity is directly covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements and since most of the key sectors are union-
ized, a further important segment of the nonunion sector is effectively in-
fluenced and controlled by the union sector8. Edmund Phelps on the other 
hand has argued that since only one in four of ail workers is a union mem-
ber it is reasonable to ignore the influence of unionism9. 
But the question of the rôle of unions in inflation, or indeed in other 
aspects of économie activity such as the relative wage structure, or the dis-
tribution of functional income between labor and capital or between union 
and nonunion labor does not necessarily hinge on the extent of union cover-
age. Alfred Marshall put it this way: 
"Trade combinations, alliance, and counter-alliances among employers and employ-
ed... présent a succession of picturesque incidents... which arrest public attention 
and seem to indicate a coming change of our social arrangements now in one direc-
tion and now in another; and their importance is great and grows rapidly. But it is 
apt to be exaggerated... And though they are on a large and more imposing scale... 
than ever before; yet now, as ever, the main body of movement dépends on the deep 
silent strong stream of the tendencies of normal distribution and exchange."10 
A basic question regarding the rôle of unions in the détermination of 
the money wage level is to ask how différent the money wage level would be 
if the labor force were completely nonunion compared with the reality of its 
being partly union. If unions make no différence then the change in the 
money wage level at any given level of excess demand would be like the non-
union case. It would rise at ail positive levels of excess demand and would 
probably also rise at small levels of excess supply of labor because of the 
8 O. ECKSTEIN and T. A. WILSON, "The Détermination of Money Wages in Ameri-
can Industry", Quarterly Journal of Economies 86, August 1962; John T. DUNLOP (Ed.), 
The Theory of Wage Détermination, London, Macmillan, 1957, p. 25. 
9 Edmund S. PHELPHS, "Money Wage Dynamics and Labor Market Equilibrium", 
Journal of Political Economy, 76, 4, Part II, July-August 1968, p. 680. 
10 Alfred MARSHALL, Principles of Economies, London, Macmillan, 8th édition, 
reprinted 1952, pp. 521-2. 
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uneven distribution of vacancies and unemployment, and the nonlinearity 
of wage responses where wages are inflexible downwards11. 
In a récent book on The Economies of Inflation Trevithick and 
Mulvey12 describe various hypothetical union reaction functions, showing 
the différent ways in which the existence of unions might alter the response 
of the money wage level to various levels of excess demand for labor. A 
modified version of their diagram is reproduced hère as Figure 1. The situa-
tions depicted are linear, non-accelerating, and are responses to the single 
variable of excess demand for labor and therefore to some extent unrealis-
tic. In the first place, in reality the reaction functions are certainly not 
linear. Second, even though Lipsey argues13 that there is no obvious acceler-
ator mechanism, this directly contradicts the Friedman-Phelps thesis14. 
Finally, union reaction functions are not necessarily most strongly influ-
enced by excess demand but rather by past price changes, expected price 
changes or relative wages, which are not necessarily dépendent upon the 
level of excess demand15. 
This latter qualification is particularly important because writers hâve 
tended to be concerned with the rôle of unions in situations characterized by 
various levels of excess demand, Ep> if only because stagflation is relatively 
new. However, the union/nonunion wage change differential, W u /W n u 
responds to other variables too, and possibly even to an extent that over-
shadows the response to excess demand. Thus if we hâve a case as at présent 
where priées are rising at a 9-10 percent rate and some unions hâve substan-
tially compensatory COLA clauses then they will pull away from less strate-
gically placed union and nonunion groups. This is almost certainly one of 
the factors in the current changing structure. 
Conditions in which unions will give an inflationary bias to the System 
(assuming (1) that the percentage of the labor force receiving the union 
wage is constant, and (2) the union/nonunion wage change differential is at-
tributable only to unionism), may be classified as follows: 
il R.G. LIPSEY, "The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of 
Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom: 1862-1957: A Further Analysis", Economica, 
February 1960. 
12 J.A. TREVITHICK and C. MULVEY, The Economies of Inflation, London, Martin 
Robertson, 1975, p. 88. 
13 R.G. LIPSEY, "The Place of the Phillips Curve in Macroeconomic Models", in A.R. 
Bergstrom et al. (Eds.), Stability and Inflation, New York, Wiley, 1978, p. 67. 
u M. FRIEDMAN, "The Rôle of Monetary Policy", American Economie Review, 
April 1968; E.S. PHELPS, op. cit. 
15 The development of thèse more comprehensive and alternative explanatory Systems is 
described in T.M. HUMPHREY, "Some Current Controversies in the Theory of Inflation" 
and "Some Récent Developments in Phillips Curve Analysis", reprinted in T.M. Humphrey, 
Essays on Inflation, Richmond, Va., Fédéral Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1980. 
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a) if, at ail levels of ETJ there is a W u /W n u wage change differential, we 
hâve case 2 or 4. 
b) if, as the level of Ej) increases the W u /W n u wage change differential 
decreases until it becomes zéro, we hâve case 3. 
c) if, as the level of Erj increases the Wu/ Wn u wage change differential is 
constant or increases, we hâve case 2. 
* • 
d) if, as the level of Ej) increases the W u /W n u wage change differential 
decreases, we hâve case 5. 
e) if there is a spillover mechanism which runs from the U sector to the Un 
sector when Ej) < B, then the assumption that the percentage of the 
labor force receiving the union wage will apply to the whole labor force, 
so that the System is more inflationary than where there is no such spill-
over. 
The Trevithick-Mulvey classification of possible responses is interest-
ing in part because it shows the important cases, but also because each re-
sponse has its académie adhérents. Many of thèse with widely divergent 
views hâve written extensively on the topic and hâve generalized their con-
clusions. 
Case 1. That unionism does not affect the outeome of the market process, 
so that 
Wu = x + aED; a> O; Wu = Wn u 
Among writers who hâve subscribed to this view are writers as diverse in 
background and interest as Alfred Marshall, Phelps Brown, Edward 
Phelps, and Michael Wachter. Hère, however, we will describe only 
Wachter's position. 
MICHAEL S. WACHTER 
Michael Wachter discusses the rôle of unions in inflation in the 
post-1950 years and concludes that it has been of minor significance16. He 
bases his view on the absence of any trend in the union-nonunion wage dif-
16 M.L. WACHTER and S.M. WACHTER, "Money Wage Inflation: The Endogeneity 
- Exogeneity Issue", in S. Weintraub (Ed.), Modem Economie Thought, University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1977, pp. 322-5. For the continuing development of his views, see M.L. 
WACHTER and O.E. WILLIAMSON, "Obligational Markets and the Mechanics of Infla-
tion", The Bell Journal of Economies, 9, 2, Autumn 1978, pp. 561-2, and M.L. WACHTER 
and S.M. WACHTER, "Institutional Factors in Domestic Inflation", in F.E. Morris, After 
the Phillips Curve: Persistence of High Inflation and High Unemployment, Boston, Fédéral 
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1978, pp. 151-3. 
THE RÔLE OF UNIONS IN INFLATION: A SURVEY ARTICLE 503 
ferential since 1950, and the decreasing likelihood over time that nonunion 
employers act under a threat of unionization. Hence the theory that there is 
a substantial spillover from union wage change into the nonunion sector has 
become increasingly less crédible. 
FIGURE 1 
Hypothetical Union Reaction Functions 
1. W u = x + a E D ; a > 0 ; W u = W n u . 
2. W u = z + dE D ; with W u = O at E D < A; d > a and z > x > O. 
3. W u = y + bE D ; b > a , and > y >x for E D < B; b = a for E D > B. 
4. W u = s + gEj)î g < a for E D < F and g > a for E D > F; s < x. 
u 
W u = t + hE D ; h < a and x > t > 0 . 5: 
W u is the rate of change of union wage rates; W n u the rate of change of nonunion wage rates; 
and E D is the level of excess demand for labor. 
Wachter appears to be one writer, however, whose views on the infla-
tion process are rapidly evolving. In récent works which carry his name cer-
tain basic ideas are becoming distinguishable: 
a) that there is a strong intuitive case for believing that unions are not a sig-
nificant factor in the inflation process in the U.S. 
b) that the money supply is an essential ingrédient in the inflation process. 
However, the explanation which relies on a combination of union cost-
504 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 3 (1982) 
push and an accommodative monetary policy is not substantiable. In his 
view, for the inflation process to continue the money supply miust be ac-
commodative. However, this is not inconsistent with the view that the 
cause of the inflation was excessive growth of the money supply. In this 
sensé he, therefore, becomes distinguished from such cost-push writers 
as Phelps Brown, Hicks, and Joan Robinson. In the latters' Systems a 
passive money supply adapts to the "needs of trade" or to the needs of a 
full employment policy which has been jeopardized by union cost-push 
pressures. 
c) that the money supply is the exogenous factor in inflation. However, he 
concèdes the possibility of union cost-push pressures emanating from 
the fédéral government and the construction industry. Thèse, he asserts, 
are a small part of the overall inflation problem. 
d) that the money supply is a control and not a response variable. To the 
extent that it is accommodative the reason is that the short-run économie 
and political costs may be high. However, thèse costs are not necessarily 
union-related. Thus, the money supply can be an effective control varia-
ble only if an appropriately long time horizon is adopted, with the short-
run real output costs being a necessary part of the disinflation process. 
Case 2. biases the outeome of the market process such that 
W u = z + dE D ; with W u = O at C < A; d > a, and z > x > O. 
Writers whose interprétation of facts or whose analyses hâve led them 
to subscribe to this view include, among others, Haberler — who might well 
be taken as representing the Liberalist school of économie philosophy, and 
Joan Robinson a leading représentative of contemporary socialist thought. 
HABERLER 
In the postwar debate on the rôle of unions in the inflationary process, 
Haberler is unquestionably one of the most profound and consistent advo-
cates of the significance of wage-push. Among the Liberalists he is the most 
systematic thinker and the most conscious that apparent contradictions 
among Liberalists should be reconcilable. In his view of the économie Sys-
tem, économie growth proeeeds in a eyelieal fashion. Within this eyelieal 
framework union power is reflected in a more rapid growth of wages and 
priées in the boom and in greater downward inflexibility in the recession. 
In his early work on Prosperity and Dépression Haberler recognized 
that wages were income as well as costs. Hence, in the absence of a full em-
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ployment policy the more rapid upward thrust of wages could raise the ceil-
ing, and the downward inflexibility of wages could lessen the severity of the 
recession17. 
However, given a full employment policy the more rapid growth of 
wages reduces the ceiling in the boom and the greater downward inflexibili-
ty enhances the tendency for wages to rise in a recession. Thus the sytem 
becomes inherently inflationary and the existence of unions frustrâtes the 
high employment policy. 
The dilemma thus posed for society can be overcome by the adoption 
of wage and/or price controls or by curbing union power. The social costs 
of ail options — accelerating inflation, unemployment, and controls — 
other than curbing union power are high. Therefore, the proper alternative 
is to reduce union monopoly power by removing the immunities and privi-
lèges that constitute the source of that power. 
JOAN ROBINSON 
Few writers give unions such a crucial rôle in the workings of the econ-
omy as does Joan Robinson. In fact, the survival of capitalism hinges on 
unions having the right amount of économie power. Union power in the dé-
termination of the economy's propensity to spend, and the size and nature 
of the public sector's spending, together détermine whether the economy 
falls into stagnation or explodes in hyper-inflation. Capitalism's inhérent 
contradictions can be offset only by an appropriate public sector spending 
program and a labor movement with the correct amount of power18. 
What are thèse contradictions? The secular growth in monopoly re-
duces consumers' sovereignty and increases the degree of exploitation of 
labor and consumers. It decreases the share of income going to labor and 
consumers and thereby reduces the profitability of new investment. If then 
the labor force is constant and disinvestment occurs, or if the labor force 
grows while net investment stays the same, the System will become increas-
ingly stagnant. 
n G. HABERLER, Prosperity and Dépression: A Theoretical Analysis of Cyclical 
Movements, Geneva, League of Nations, 1973; also, "Wage Policy, Employment and Eco-
nomie Stability", in D. McCord Wright, The Impact of the Union, New York, Kelley and 
Millman, 1951, pp. 49-50; also Economie Growth and Stability, Los Angeles, Nash, 1974. 
is Joan ROBINSON, "Full Employment and Inflation" (1958), in CollectedEconomie 
Papers, Vol. 2, Oxford, Blackwell, 1964, p. 278. See also C.G. WILLIAMS, "Joan Robinson 
on Unions, Distribution and Inflation", Relations industrielles, 36, 3, 1981, pp. 576-588. 
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Similarly, in conditions of technical progress output growth is accom-
panied by decreased unit costs of production. But the ubiquity of product 
market imperfection and the growth of product monopoly inhibits down-
ward flexibility of priées. Thus in the absence of institutional arrangements 
to ensure commensurate increases in money incomes there would be an in-
creasing surplus of consumer goods, a décline in the propensity to invest, 
and thus again a tendency towards stagnation19. 
What keeps the System going? Even more pointedly, what was the 
essence of the unprecedented prosperity of the industrial world in the 
1960s? The answer from Joan Robinson's standpoint lies in the public sec-
tor income transfer and job création programs, the arms race, union suc-
cesses in collective bargaining, and the expansion of labor-absorbing service 
activities, both public and private. This answer constitutes to Joan 
Robinson the ultimate déniai of the ability of capitalism to survive except by 
reliance on public-sector-initiated consumption and by a fine balance of 
union power. 
To Joan Robinson an increase in the quantity of money is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition of inflation, but even then only for high and 
continuing rates of inflation. In her system the essence of inflation is a rapid 
and continuous rise of money wages. Without rising wages inflation cannot 
occur20. The driving force is the money wage level and there is no doubt but 
that she would hâve us believe that the quantity of money, is a necessary but 
not a stringent condition of inflation, having at almost ail times enough 
tolérance for substantial increases in priées21. 
Case 3. biases the outcome of the market process such that 
W u = y + bEj); b > a and z > y > x for E-j) < B; and b = a for Ej) > B 
Many studies can be identified with this view of the union reaction 
function. From the scholars represented by thèse studies we will sélect only 
Charles Holt. 
CHARLES HOLT 
Holt's interest in the relationship between the wage advantage of union 
workers and the level of excess demand for labor stems from his désire to 
19 J.A. KREGEL, The Reconstruction of Political Economy, London, Macmillan, 
1973, p. 85. 
20 Joan ROBINSON, "The Economies of Hyper Inflation", (1958), in Collected Eco-
nomie Papers, Vol. 1, Oxford, Blackwell, 1961, p. 71. 
2i Joan ROBINSON, The Accumulation of Capital, London, Macmillan, 1956, p. 240. 
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show how a Phillips relation between wage change and unemployment can 
be derived using labor market behavioral variables. His approach is based 
on his belief that the upward drift of money wages has its source in thèse 
variables. This upward drift is transmitted recursively to priées via a mark-
up process22. 
In Holt's model the advantage to collective bargaining compared to in-
dividual bargaining varies positively with the unemployment rate. This ad-
vantage is based on the differential effects of varying unemployment rates 
on the ratio of strike cost to employer and union (strike cost ratio Com-
pany/Union) compared with the quit cost ratio to company and worker. 
For many reasons, as unemployment rises the bargaining power of the in-
dividual worker falls more rapidly that does that of the union. Consequent-
ly at levels of unemployment above a certain rate, there is a wage advantage 
associated with worker participation in collective bargaining. Conversely, at 
some low level of unemployment the advantage shifts to individual bargain-
ing as jobs become plentiful and replacements hard to find. At higher rates 
of unemployment the union threat to strike (i.e., to collectively quit tempo-
rarily) is less important than the quit threat (i.e., to individually quit per-
manently) so the union differential tends to disappear. 
The analysis in Holt's discussion is more complex than is suggested 
hère but in simple terms it means that "as the quit threat becomes dominant 
over the strike threat the market tends to behave more and more like a free 
market with only individual bargaining."23 This resuit is illustrated in 
Figure 2. At unemployment rates over U^ the collective bargaining advan-
tage increases up to some maximum level, while at unemployment rates 
below Ub the union advantage becomes négative though the individual 
union member retains the right to quit and thus to simulate the conditions 
of individual bargaining. 
22 Charles C. H O L T , " J o b Search, Phil l ips ' Wage Relat ions, and Union Influence: 
Theory and Ev idence" , in E .S . Phelps , Microeconomic Foundations ofEmployaient and In-
flation Theory, New York, Nor ton , 1970. 
23 Ibid., p . 84. 
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FIGURE 2 
Collective Bargaining Advantage Over Individual Bargaining 
Strike cost 
ratio minus 
quit cost 
ratio 
O 
Unemployment 
Source: See footnote 23. 
Case 4. biases the outcome of the market process such that 
W, s + gErj; g < a for Erj < F; and g > a for Erj > F; s < x 
JOHN T. DUNLOP 
The most noted représentative of this class of ideas is John T. Dunlop. 
It could even be true that many economists who do not write on the subject 
of unionism would find themselves in agreement with Dunlop's basic posi-
tion. 
In Dunlop's view, the totality of monetary and fiscal policies is the key 
to économie stability. At an earlier stage in his career Dunlop was optimistic 
that with the spread of collective bargaining and with its increased social 
and political acceptance collective bargaining could absorb or cushion some 
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of the effects of "unwise" monetary and fiscal policies24. However, 
Dunlop's view of the rôle of collective bargaining is now considerably more 
complex. Collective bargaining will not absorb or cushion "large effects" 
or "persistent effects" of unwise monetary and fiscal policies. Should the 
latter be "not appropriate" for stability, collective bargaining will not sta-
bilize and may be destabilizing. In his view, collective bargaining is only one 
of many factors that can hâve some impact upon the process of inflation. 
Monetary and fiscal policy can be inappropriate for stability; collective bar-
gaining agreements may be inconsistent with stability; bottlenecks may 
develop in the production process and thèse may generate gênerai price 
pressures in the context of high employment. By the same token, collective 
bargaining may lessen the impact of other destabilizing forces, and mone-
tary and fiscal policy can also hâve this effect25. 
In arriving at this rather broad view of the place of unionism in the 
wage-price process, Dunlop draws on a lifetime of intellectual activity as 
teacher, writer, arbitrator and mediator, and administrator, in both aca-
démie and public service at national levels of status and récognition. Ideolo-
gically, he is in basic agreement with the philosophy of the System of labor 
relations laws and with the gênerai state of balance (or imbalance) in labor-
management relations and internai union relations which hâve evolved un-
der the aegis of those laws. He holds the existence and practice of unionism 
to be basically consistent with the attainment of reasonable degrees of satis-
faction of the generally accepted social goals of high employment, price 
stability, international payments balance, labor peace, économie growth, 
équitable income and earnings distributions, and efficient decentralized 
price-output décision making. 
In Dunlop's view, unions are political institutions which make éco-
nomie décisions in a political/économie environment. They are, therefore, 
part of an administered price System with union leadership having varying 
degrees of autonomy in the setting of union goals and varying degrees of 
constraints in the attainment of those goals. 
Case 5. biases the outeome of the market process such that 
W u = t + hErj>; h < a and x > t > O 
24 John T. D U N L O P , "Wage-Price Relations at High Level Employment", American 
Economie Revies, 37, 2, May 1947. Also C.G. WILLIAMS, "John Dunlop and Phelps Brown 
on the Rôle of Unions in Inflation", Labor Studies Journal, 5, 3, Winter 1981. 
25 D .C. BOK and John T. D U N L O P , Labor and the American Community, New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1970, espec. Ch. 10, "Collective Bargaining and Inflation". 
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MILTON FRIEDMAN 
The economist who best represents this view is Milton Friedman, one 
of the leading modem day Liberalists. While Friedman's views on the ap-
propriate policy that society should adopt towards labor unions may not 
differ from the typical Libertarian view, the alleged rôle of unions described 
hère is not part of Friedman's rationale. Friedman's views stem from the 
belief that unions violate économie freedom and in some circumstances pro-
vide support for cartelization and monopoly in business. His policy recom-
mendations follow from his belief that, in the absence of unions, either the 
economy is basically compétitive or that adding unions to an imperfectly 
compétitive System further decreases the system's competitiveness. 
To Friedman the main impact of unionism is redistributive, altering the 
structure of relative wages, priées, and employment opportunities. Union-
ism also raises the natural rate of unemployment — that rate which alone is 
consistent with non-accelerating inflation or déflation. To Friedman, a 
change in union power is a once-for-all change in the degree of union mo-
nopoly resulting in once-for-all changes in the structure of resource allo-
cation. 
Writing in 1951, Friedman expressed the view that the danger in the 
relationship between unions and inflation was not that strong unions would 
cause inflation but rather that inflation would produce strong unions. In 
continued inflation he said: 
"... the rigidity effects of unions would tend to become weaker relative to their up-
ward pressing effects, for two reasons. In the first place, employers would corne to 
expect continued inflation, and so attach less importance to the difficulty of subse-
quently lowering wages once raised. In the second place, the increased économie 
strength of the unions produced by the inflation would mean greater power to force 
wage increases, i.e. greater upward pressure."26 
Given the appropriate monetary policy Friedman agreed that cost-push 
could originate from labor unions or indeed any strongly organized groups 
such as farmers or automobile producers. But it would be accompanied by 
unemployment. While logically possible, cost-push inflation would be em-
pirically unimportant. 
Thirty years later, Friedman no longer dénies that unions may be 
strong, whether in conséquence of many years of inflation or of the many 
factors that might hâve increased union power over the years. At this late 
date there is the possibility that unions are strong, but despite this they do 
not cause inflation. In his words 
26 M. FRIEDMAN, "Some Comments on the Significance of Labor Unions for Eco-
nomie Policy", in D. McCord Wright (Ed.), The Impact of the Union, op. cit., p. 231. 
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"I am not saying that the existence of strong unions may not be one of the factors 
that... affects what monetary policy is. But... it is just one of many influences. What 
produces the inflation is not trade unions, nor monopolistic employers, but what 
happens to the quantity of money."27 
As we view his extensive writings, it is probably true to say that 
Friedman would rewrite his 1951 paper in virtually unamended form as his 
continuing view of the rôle of unions in inflation. 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNION POWER AND UNION MILITANCY 
This is especially important in a study of the impact of unions, both on 
the wage structure and the wage level. It could be said, for example, that 
the more powerful unions are, the more militant they are. The concepts are 
distinguishable and should be identified in order to trace the impact of 
unions. 
Union power refers to the capacity of the union sector to establish, 
with a given degree of militancy and on the basis of unionization alone, a 
wage differential W u / W n u . This differential is a reflection of the degree of 
monopoly power inhérent in unionization. The évidence shows that this dif-
ferential is not constant. It varies primarily with cyclical conditions, widen-
ing in periods of recession and narrowing in periods of boom. As noted 
earlier the ratio is affected also by the other factors of past and expected 
price changes and by a probably différent response of the union and non-
union sectors to changes in relative wages. 
Cross section point-in-time studies hâve tended to ignore thèse other 
factors in part because, until récent years, price changes were small, pos-
sibly less than some threshold amount, and because relative wage move-
ments hâve been cyclically compensated for, and either secularly minor or 
less than some threshold amount. Thus, earlier studies hâve tended to show 
union power as measured by the W u / W n u ratio varying according to pre-
vailing conditions of excess demand. 
In a récent article, Brian Griffiths summarizes the results of some of 
thèse studies: 
"The séminal work in estimating the impact of how much more union members 
receive that comparable nonunion laborers was undertaken by H.G. Lewis at the 
University of Chicago [x]. He found that the effects of unions on the average wage 
of union labor compared to the average nonunion wage range from 25 percent or 
more in the 1930's to less than 8 percent immediately after the Second World War, 
and rose to around 15 percent by the second half of the 1950's. Studies in the U.S. 
27 M. FRIEDMAN, Vnemployment Versus Inflation: An Evaluation of the Phillips 
Curve, London, Institute of Economie Affairs, 1975, p. 33. 
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since then using other évidence hâve ail shown a significant effect. Using 1960 census 
data, Lewis found that wages of maie operatives and craftsmen were about 20 per-
cent higher than comparable nonunion rates [x]; Stafford, using Survey of Con-
sumer Finance data, found it varied between 18 and 52 percent [xl; Throop, using 
aggregate industry data, found it 25 percent in 1950 and 30 percent in 1960 [x] ; using 
disaggregated data it was found that in highly unionized industries it was 38 percent 
while in highly non-unionized industries only 10 percent; and others hâve found that 
the differential décline with éducation is greater for younger — and older — âge 
catégories than for middle-age catégories and greater for black than white 
workers.»28 
Looked at over time the movement of W u / W n u would be seen as a dif-
ferential response of union wages and nonunion wages to changing condi-
tions of excess demand. Several studies hâve examined the responsiveness of 
W u / W n u to varying levels of excess demand (as denoted by the level of 
profits or unemployment)#or to changes in the levels of excess demand. 
They hâve tended to find W u less responsive to# thèse variables — a finding 
that suggests the greater cyclical amplitude of W n u . 
Is there a trend in W u / W n u ? Several indices are available which direct-
ly or indirectly measure changes in this differential over time. But the évi-
dence is conflicting. 
1. A wage dispersion index which measures the dispersion among 
average earnings by industry, but without a corresponding linking of those 
earnings with a unionization index. (See Figure 3.) 
Throop29, Wachter30, and Kosters31 would hâve us believe that the equi-
librium standard déviation is that which prevailed in the 1950's;, or the early 
1970's. Throop describes the widening dispersion of the late 1950's as a con-
tinuing response to the differential narrowing that had occurred during 
World War II and the lagged response of wage dispersion to the unfulfilled 
new unionism of the war and postwar years. Kosters describes the widening 
dispersion in 1969-72 as a lagged response to the inordinate narrowing of 
the 1960s. Wachter also attributes the widening during those years to the in-
terplay of market forces, and states that this is not to be described as a "cost 
push" expérience. 
28 B. GRIFFITHS, "Economies of Labour Power: Can Labour Unions Raise Real 
Wages?", in A. Seldon (Ed.), Trade Unions: Public Goods or Public Bads, London, The Insti-
tute of Economie Affairs, 1978, pp. 197-8. 
29 A . W . T H R O O P , " T h e Union-Nonunion Wage Differential and Cost-Push Infla-
t i o n " , American Economie Review, LVIII , 1, March 1968, pp . 90-1 . 
30 M. W A C H T E R , " T h e Current Wage Controls : An Evaluat ion of Phase I I " , Whar-
ton Quarterly, VII , 1, Fall 1972, p . 32. 
31 M. KOSTERS, "Wage Behavior in the 1970's", in W. Fellner (Ed.), Contemporary 
Economie Problem, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1978, p. 149. 
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FIGURE 3 
Changes in Relative Earnings and Unemployment 
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Source: M. KOSTERS, "Wage Behavior in the 1970's" in W. Fellner, Contemporary Econo-
mie Problems, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1978, p. 147. 
Taken alone the discussion is not convincing. Clearly if we relied only 
on this measure, we would hâve to conclude that there is a trend in the dis-
persion. It must be repeated, however, that this index does not hâve an ex-
plicit union dimension. 
2. A measure which plots over time the ratio of industry wages by ex-
tent of unionization to the average hourly earnings in the private nonfarm 
sector. The picture we get from this comparative study is one which shows 
virtually no trend. (See Figure 4.) 
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FIGURE 4 
Average Hourly Earnings Ratios by Extent of Unionism, 1955-1977 
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Note: Thèse ratios are averages of ratios of average hourly earnings for each 
industry in the catégories shown to average hourly earnings in the private non-
farm sector. Ratios for manufacturing industries are based on data adjusted for 
overtime. 
Source: M. KOSTERS, op. cit., p. 148. 
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Without implying a préjudice towards showing that the path which is 
displayed in this figure understates the influence of unionism, it is not amiss 
to point out that this figure relates only to wages. It is not a measure of 
compensation. In the early i960's there was considérable interest in union 
circles in the dangers of technological displacement. This resulted in three 
years of inordinately low union wage increases, prompted by the absence of 
a gênerai wage increase in steel in 1962, in steel and aluminum in 1963, and 
in auto manufacturing in 1964. 
That the fortunes of différent groups vary in terms of their status on 
this ratio scale is évident from the following quotation from a report by the 
Council on Wage and Price Stability in 1978. 
An examination of the wage rates of various subgroups of workers indicates 
that significant changes hâve occurred in the wage structure of American industry. 
For exemple, steelworkers' hourly earnings were about 35 percent above the private 
nonfarm average in 1967, but were about 65 percent above the average in 1977. A 
similar rise in relative wages is évident in other basic industries. On the other hand, 
wages for workers in the apparel and other textile industries were 24 percent below 
the private nonfarm average in 1967, and about 31 percent below the average in 
1977. At the beginning of the last recession in 1973, wages in contract construction 
were significantly above those in coal mining and steel, but in 1977, the average con-
struction wage was below that of coal miners and steelworkers. The change in rela-
tive of construction workers resulted largely from the severe impact of the recession 
on the construction industry and compétition from nonunion contractors32. 
It would be highly unlikely that the product market alone explains the 
pattern that appears from examining individual industries as shown in 
Figure 5. Certain groups of workers hâve been better able to protect them-
selves from real wage érosion during the 1970's33. At least a part of this im-
munity dérives from labor market control through strong unionism. How-
ever, as Walter Fogel observes, a further part dérives from product market 
imperfection. In his words, " . . . a number of noncompetitive industries do 
not resist uneconomic wage demands because the résultant cost increases 
support pricing behavior which maximises short-run profits, and the long-
32 Executive Office of the Président, A Quarterly Report of the Council on Wage and 
Price Stability, with a Spécial Report on Inflation, Washington, D . C . , 1978, C O W P S Report 
Number 13, p . 40. 
33 This statement does not imply that the most advantaged groups hâve secured complète 
protection from real wage érosion in the sensé of maintaining or increasing real spendable 
earnings through cost-of-living protection clauses or provisions. But the relative advantage is 
not minor. At the steelworkers' hourly earnings in 1968 of $3.82, a constant ratio of 1.52 to the 
nonagricultural average hourly earnings would make a différence in the 1978 average annual 
gross earnings of $2,246, assuming a 40-hour week, 52-week year. 
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run problems are thought to be better dealt with at a governmental level."34 
Thus an appropriate remedy would hâve to deal with this problem at both 
levels. 
3. A third measure of union power is that reflected in wage changes 
each year in the union and nonunion sectors. Table 1 allows us to compare 
changes in union and nonunion wages for production workers in U.S. 
manufacturing. There are ambiguities in thèse kinds of measures. Foremost 
among them is the fact that a division by union/nonunion status alone sug-
gests that the différent outcomes are attributable only to that union/non-
union division. This is not necessarily true. Unionism is correlated with 
many factors which hâve a wage change impact — the industry concentra-
tion ratio, industry location, initial wage level, the proportion of females in 
the industry employment, the capital/labor ratio, the average size of estab-
lishment, the proportion of fringe benefit cost to total employée compen-
sation. By way of example, Steven Lustgarten shows how wage increases are 
associated positively with the industry concentration ratio, but since labor 
productivity increases are also associated positively with that ratio, the ten-
dency is for concentration to be inversely associated with changes in unit 
labor costs and hence with the size of price increases35. We hâve strong 
reasons to believe that thèse factors affect the cyclical sensitivity of wage 
changes, and it has not been disproved that they hâve an effect on the secu-
lar trend of wage changes also. 
While the question of causation may be arguable, Mitchell does accept 
that the divergence is union-based36. He argues that the increasing diver-
gence of union/nonunion wages may well explain the hardening résistance 
of managements to unionism. This is reflected in the declining success rate 
of unions in National Labor Relations Board élections, the declining union-
ization rate in the total labor force, the accelerated movements of industry 
in the i960's and 1970's to the less union-prone South, and the large num-
ber of wage concessions which are a current feature of widespread agree-
ment reopenings37. 
34 W.A. FOGEL, Discussion of M.H. Kosters, "Relative Wages and Inflation", Annual 
Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 30th Meeting, 1977, p. 216; and 
A.G. SHILLING, "American Labor-From Cartels to Compétition", Wall Street Journal, 
January 21, 1982, p. 26. 
35 S. L U S T G A R T E N , Industrial Concentration and Inflation, Washington , D . C . , 
American Enterprise Insti tute, 1975, p p . 29-32. 
36 D . J . B . M I T C H E L L , " S o m e Empirical Observat ions of Relevance to the Analysis of 
Union Wage Dé te rmina t ion" , Journal of Labor Research, 1, 2, Fall 1980, p p . 199-201. 
37 W. SERRIN, "Unions Yielding Givebacks to Employers at Rising Rates", New York 
Times, Oct. 11, 1981, pp. 1 and 13; J. GUYON, "Local Unions Accept Pay and Benefit Cuts 
to Try to Rescue Jobs", Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1981, pp. 1 and 18. 
FIGURE 5 
Average Houriy Earnings Ratios, Production and Nonsupervisory Workers in 
Selected Industry Groups to Private Nonagricultural Payrolls 
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings. 
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A différent argument over causality is the view that unionism itself is 
endogenous with respect to relative wages. Gregg Lewis (1959)38 and Reder39 
raised this possibility. Since that time other writers hâve attempted to estab-
lish and quantify this relationship. Parsley (1980) describes the studies by 
Ashenfelter and Johnson40 (1972), Schmidt and Strauss41 (1976) and Lee42 
(1976) which confirm that unionism is not independent of wage changes. 
Maki and Christensen43 find that after allowing for the effect of higher 
wages on union coverage, the effect of union coverage on wages is still very 
substantial. Their study does not allow for the many other factors which we 
know to be associated with unionism, nor does it address itself specifically 
to wage changes. Thus the ambiguity of what precisely is being measured 
when we speak of union power would appear to be still in need of identifica-
tion. It would not be amiss to point out however that in the United States if 
the causality runs from earnings to union membership the growing diver-
gence reflected in Table 1 would suggest an increasing differential while the 
percentage of the labor force unionized continues to décline. 
UNION MILITANCY 
Union militancy can be defined as the propensity of a union to press 
for advantage in bargaining, given the magnitude of the factors which 
détermine union power. The degree of union militancy is the extent to which 
a given degree of power provides a bargaining advantage. The two variables 
are not always independent. For example, the militancy of the U.S. coal 
miners in 1978 was in part a resuit of the breakdown in the union's internai 
administrative machinery; union militancy may be a response to some ad-
verse législative or judicial décision. On the other hand, there are clear in-
stances where spontaneous militancy erupts as for example on an interna-
tional scale in 1968, and in Britain in early 1979. Thèse are times when, as 
38 H. Gregg LEWIS, "Compétitive and Monopoly Unionism", in P.D. Bradley (Ed.), 
The Public Stake in Union Power, Charlottes ville, University of Virginia Press, 1959, pp. 
190-2. 
39 M . W . R E D E R , " U n i o n s and Wages: The Problem of Measu remen t " , Journal of 
Political Economy, 73 , April 1965, p . 192. 
40 O. A S H E N F E L T E R and G.E . J O H N S O N , "Un ion i sm, Relative Wages, and Labor 
Quality in U . S . Manufactur ing Indus t r ies" , International Economie Review, 13, 3, October 
1972. 
41 P. SCHMIDT and R.P. STRAUSS, "The Effect of Unions on Earnings and Earnings 
on Unions: A Mixed Logit Approach", International Economie Review, 17, 1, February 1976. 
42 Lee L U N G - F E I , "Un ion i sm and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equat ions Model with 
Qualitative and Limited Dépendent Var iab les" , mimeo, University of Florida, 1976. 
43 D. MAKI and S. C H R I S T E N S E N , " T h e Union Wage Effect Re-Examined" , Rela-
tions industrielles, 35, 2, 1980. 
TABLE 1 |
 x 
m 
Current and Effective Wages Changes for Production Workers in Manufacturing (1959-1977) | *> 
r m 
O 
/. Current Wage Changes 1959-1977 { A = change) Production Workers in Manufacturing I G 
1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 | 
a) Médian Increases — Annual °7o A (Wage Increases resulting from current settlements or décisions) 
Ail union 3.7 3.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.5 3.6 4.1 5.5 6.5 6.9 7.4 8.4 5.5 5.8 7.6 8.6 8.3 8.3 8.0 
Nonunion 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.2 4.0 4.4 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.8 5.5 5.1 6.0 8.6 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.5 
b) Médian Adjustments Actual % A (Wage adjustments including décisions for no change) I o 
Ail union 3.4 3.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.4 4.0 5.5 6.4 6.9 7.3 8.2 5.5 5.7 7.5 8.6 8.3 8.3 8.0 
Nonunion 3.2 2.2 1.2 1.6 2.8 2.0 3.2 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.7 5.0 5.5 8.0 6.0 6.5 6.5 7.0 | w 
c 
c) Workers receiving increases as % of workers subject to wage décision I < 
Ail union 93.7 93.1 89.5 74.4 77.3 89.3 92.5 96.1 98.4 99.3 98.9 98.1 98.3 97.8 98.7 98.3 98.6 99.2 96.9 97.4 . 
Nonunion 66.5 56.8 52.8 53.2 69.2 55.5 75.3 77.3 80.8 87.0 75.8 76.7 69.6 82.9 98.8 87.4 92.3 96.4 94.6 88.0 » 
//. Effective Wage Changes 1959-1977 Production Workers in Manufacturing 
a) Médian Increases — Annual °Io A (Wage A s including curr. increases, deferred increases, and COLAs) 
Ail union 3.6 3.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.6 3.2 3.8 3.9 5.1 5.0 5.9 6.2 5.4 6.3 8.1 8.4 7.8 8.0 8.3 
Nonunion 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.2 4.0 4.5 4.8 5.0 6.0 5.9 5.5 5.2 6.0 8.7 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.5 
b) Médian Adjustments — Actual % A (Wage A s including décisions for no change) 
Ail union 3.4 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.9 3.2 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.7 6.1 5.2 6.2 8.0 8.2 7.7 8.0 8.3 
Nonunion 3.3 2.5 1.0 1.6 2.8 2.0 3.2 3.9 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.7 5.0 5.6 8.0 6.3 6.5 6.5 7.2 
Sources: M. ESTEY, "Union and Nonunion Wage Changes 1959-1972", in Price and Wage Control: An Evaluation of Current Policies, Hearings 
before the Joint Economie Committee, Congress of the United States, 92nd Congress, 2 Session Part 2, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1972, pp. 323-31. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Wage Developments, May 1981, p. 50, Tables 1, 2, 3, 4. 
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Phelps Brown wisely says in his cost-push explanation of the 1968 pay ex-
plosion, "whatever the monetary supply, an explosion, ... in which pay 
continued to be pushed up while business confidence waned and unemploy-
ment mounted, could not hâve occurred without a deepgoing change in atti-
tudes and expectations."44 
Obviously if thèse periods arise and there is an accommodative 
monetary-fiscal policy together with some spillover mechanism, the unions 
could initiate a wage-price spiral. Evidence seems to suggest that the spill-
over is positive but less than complète, so that spontaneous bursts of mili-
tancy may establish positions of wage advantage — which will be eroded 
over time as other sectors display militant moods. 
As for the monetary-fiscal mechanism, the tendency has been for this 
to be accommodative. Whether money does matter but is difficult to con-
trol, or money does not matter anyway, another wise statement by Phelps 
Brown expresses his view that " . . . 'the struggle against inflation' would be 
needless if ail that had to be done was to regulate the quantity of money."45 
In his view, inflation arises from costs, especially wage costs, and the con-
trol of inflation must ultimately rest on developing an appropriate wage 
policy. 
Some studies hâve used union militancy in a différent sensé from that 
outlined above. They hâve defined union militancy as a dimension of union 
power. Union militancy and hence union power vary directly with some 
quantified pre-selected variable which serves as a proxy for union militancy. 
Examples of such proxies are the incidence of strike activity, the proportion 
of the labor force organized in unions, or the rate of change of that pro-
portion. 
The most celebrated article in this group of studies is the 1964 study by 
A.G. Hines46. The estimated équation on which he bases his justification of 
the union militancy hypothesis is the following: 
AWt = - 3 . 2 6 5 6 + 2.7022 T E + 0.1872 T E 
(0.1782) (0.0304) 
R 2 = 0.8240 
R 2 - 0.8130 ( R 2 corrected for d.f.) 
DW=1.21 
44 E . H . Phelps B R O W N , " A Non-Monetar is t View of the Pay Exp los ion" , The Three 
Banks Review, No . 105, M a r d i 1975, p . 20. 
45 E.H. Phelps BROWN and S.A. OZGA, "Economie Growth and the Price Level", 
The Economie Journal, 65, March 1955, p. 15. 
46 A . G . H I N E S , " T r a d e Unions and Wage Inflation in the United Kingdom 
1893-1961", Review of Economie Studies, 31 , 4, N o . 88, October 1964. 
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where A Tg is the ratio of change in the percentage of the labor force 
unionized and Tg is the percentage of the labor force unionized47. 
The study has been heavily criticized, particularly in a brilliant article 
by Purdy and Zis48. But Hines has persisted in his claim that this équation 
forms the basis of a belief that the process of wage inflation is essentially a 
"cost-push" phenomenon. 
The Hines thesis as developed in the 1964 and several later supportive 
Hines studies, has proved to be remarkably robust. In 1972 a study by 
Ashenfelter, Johnson and Pencavel49 found a similar model giving signifi-
cant results for United States manufacturing. An équation supports the 
thesis that unionization is a significant déterminant of the aggregate wage 
change process 
AW = 4.014 - 0.448UN t + 0.486AP t + 11.130 N + 0.420AT t + 0.439S t 
agg (1.048) (0.128) (0.186) (3.042) (0.112) (0.201) 
R 2 = 0.833; DW = 2.14; SEE = 3.46 
where A W agg is the change in the aggregate manufacturing money wage 
level, N is a New Deal dummy, UN t is the current unemployment rate, A P t 
is the economy-wide rate of change in consumer priées, A T t is the change in 
union membership (percent) and S t is a scaled ratio of work stoppages to 
union membership. Figures in parenthèses are standard errors of the coeffi-
cients50. 
From this and some broadly similar estimâtes the authors conclude that 
union pressure as reflected in the rate of change of union membership and 
the strike incidence among union members is an independent factor in the 
aggregate money wage change process. 
47 Ibid., p . 228. 
48 D.L . P U R D Y and G. ZIS , " T r a d e Unions and Wage Inflation in the U.K. : A Reap-
pra i sa l " , in D. Laidler and D . C . Purdy , Inflation and Labour Markets, Manchester , U.K. , 
Manchester University Press, 1974. 
49 O .C . A S H E N F E L T E R , G.E . J O H N S O N and J . H . P E N C A V E L , " T r a d e Unions 
and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in United States Manufactur ing Indus t ry " , Review 
of Economie Studies, 39, 1, January 1972. 
50 Ibid., p . 40. 
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In 1972 also, Swidinsky used time lost in industrial disputes as an alter-
native measure of union aggressiveness51. He appears not to distinguish be-
tween union power and union militancy, but his results do show a signifi-
cant relation between work stoppages and the rate of wage change for ail 
manufacturing in Canada over the period 1953 to 1970. A variant of his 
model gives the following results: 
dWt = -0.042 + 0.731 PR t + 19.180 UN^ 2 + 0.010 l l t _ 2 
(0.04) (9.32) (5.21) (1.07) 
+ 3.330X1^-! -0.007 dW t_ 4 
(7.23) (1.34) 
R2 = 0.919 DW= 1.308 
In this model PRt is change in the consumer price index over the past four 
quarters, UNt is the aggregate unemployment rate in the current quarter, IIt 
is an index of current corporate profits in manufacturing before tax, TLt_j 
is the time loss per production employée in manufacturing in the previous 
quarter and dWt_4 is the rate of change of wages one year back5?-. 
Thèse studies do not purport to be pure cost-push studies of the kind 
portrayed by Hines. Generally, they suggest that wage movements are the 
resuit of a variety of pressures, including changes in the price level, and the 
unemployment rate. However, they do find that measures of union militan-
cy do exercise some influence on the rate of wage change. An interesting 
variant of thèse studies is the article by Riddell (1980) in which both the 
strike action and strike length are shown to hâve a significant relation with 
the rate of wage change53. 
Like Hines, Swidinsky shows that his chosen measure of union militan-
cy, A T for Hines and TLt_j for Swidinsky, is unrelated to the level of écon-
omie activity. Purdy and Zis are sceptical on this point, insisting that there 
is "ample évidence" both for the U.S. A. and the U.K. of a positive associa-
tion between the levels of strike activity and excess demand54. 
Moreover, such studies tend to ignore the fact that strikes are at least 
partly a function of employer militancy. Some évidence exists that interin-
51 R. SWIDINSKY, 'Trade Unions and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in 
Canada, 1953-1970", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 25, 3, April 1972. 
52 Ibid., p . 370. 
53 C.W. RIDDELL, "The Effects of Strikes and Strike Length on Negotiated Wage Set-
tlements", Relations industrielles, 35, 1, 1980. 
54 D .L . P U R D Y and G. ZIS , op. cit., p . 58. 
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dustrial variations in wage changes are best explained by différences in 
management résistance factors than in union pressure variations55. More 
important as a criticism of the Hines model is the fact that Hines' régression 
does not rule out reverse causality — that Wu rises for any reason and that 
this attracts new members, or that Wn u rises for any reason and this is fol-
lowed by an increase in union membership. This is, of course, a différent 
kind of argument from that which we described earlier as a possible failing 
of the union power thesis. Hère the argument is that workers who know that 
a large wage increase claim is in the offing will join the union. To what ex-
tent this criticism is destructive of Hines' thesis is not clear at this time, 
mainly because data on changes in union membership are not available in 
the form and frequency that would allow an adéquate test of this criticism. 
WHAT DO WE KNOW? 
1. Union wages are less sensitive to current employment than are non-
union wages. Since the unemployment rate tends to change over time — 
i.e., the conditions of excess demand vary cyclically — the cyclical ampli-
tude of union wage changes is less than that of nonunion wage changes56. 
While this is partly a resuit of union contracts tending to be multi-year 
contracts, it is also true of first year increases. Since the first-year increases 
are almost invariably higher than the increases in the nonunion sector (tak-
ing into account the no-change as well as actual increases) this might be pre-
sumed to show that union wages at any level of unemployment increase 
faster than nonunion wages. 
This argument has to be qualified in three ways: 
1. The first year increases may reflect previous price changes, 
2. They may reflect responses to past changes in relative wages, 
3. The trend of increases may be set by other labor force characteris-
tics than unionism — e.g., concentration, higher trend productivity 
growth, 
4. We hâve no data on fringe benefits, and in the early 1960s the seem-
ing disadvantage of unions reflects their interest in programs of job 
and income security. 
55 D . S I N G H , C . G . W I L L I A M S and R. W I L D E R , " W a g e Détermina t ion in U . S . M a n -
ufactur ing, 1958-1976 — A Collective Bargaining A p p r o a c h " , Journal of Labor Research, 
forthcoming and D.J.B. MITCHELL, Unions, Wages, and Inflation, Washington, D.C., 
Brookings Institution, 1980, p. 72. 
56 G.E. JOHNSON, "Economie Analysis of Trade Unionism", American Economie 
Review, LXV, 2, May 1975, pp. 26-7. 
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2. Union wages tend to be more sensitive to price changes than are non-
union wages. But this too may be true only as escalator clauses are intro-
duced and as their protective coverage widens. However, even after more 
than a décade of substantial inflation COLA clauses fall far short of pro-
viding complète protection. Vroman (1981) shows that for units represen-
ting about 3 million workers in major bargaining situations in U.S. manu-
facturing, inflation protection by COLA clauses in January 1980 was 
roughly 50 percent. Some 96 percent of steelworkers were protected by 
COLA clauses which provided an average cost of living protection in 66 per-
cent. The autoworkers and machinists in the study had a protection rate of 
62 percent, electrical workers 35 percent, and the remaining work force 
covered by the study 17 percent57. 
As escalators become more widespread and effective they tend to re-
duce base rate increases. However, there is a tendency for this offset to be 
less than complète. As between collective bargaining settlements, negotiated 
increases tend to be less in the présence of COLA clauses but actual earnings 
increases tend to be greater58, and as between union and nonunion adjust-
ments the union increases tend always to exceed the nonunion59. 
3. Both union and nonunion wages are sensitive to their relative status. As 
to the absolute and relative degrees of sensitivity the évidence is far from 
conclusive. The widening of inter-industrial differentials in the late 1950s 
(i.e., the standard déviation of manufacturing wages) was said to be due to 
the slow response of union wages to the controls of the World War II and 
the new power structure implicit in the spread of unionism in the 1940s and 
early 1950s60. The front-end loading of 1969-71 was said to be a response to 
the narrowing of the structure in the tight labor markets of 1966-6961. 
But nonunion wages do not get far out of line. Several studies hâve 
tested the "spillover" hypothesis and found the union wage change to be a 
significant variable in the nonunion change62. 
57 Wayne VROMAN, "The Responsiveness of Money Wage Rates to Price Changes", 
The Urban Institute, mimeo, October 1981, p. 14. 
58 The Conférence Board, "Trends in Wages", Economie Road Maps No. 1865, Oc-
tober 1979. 
59 D.J.B. MITCHELL, "Some Empirical Observations of Relevance to the Analysis of 
Wage Détermination", op. cit., p. 199. 
60 A . W . T H R O O P , op. cit. 
61 L.D. TAYLOR, S.J. TURNOVSKY and T.A. WILSON, The Inflationary Process in 
North American Manufacturing, Toronto, Institute for the Analysis of Social and Economie 
Policy, University of Toronto, 1972. 
62 J . E A T W E L L , J. L L E W E L L Y N and R. T A R L I N G , " M o n e y Wage Inflation in In-
dustrial C o u n t r i e s " , Review of Economie Studies, 4 1 , 4, N o . 128, October 1974. 
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The Council on Wage and Price Stability asserts this to be the operative 
mechanism in wage change. They estimate the effects of the unemployment 
rate and the union effective wage change on the percentage change in aver-
age hourly earnings for the private nonfarm economy to be as follows: 
%AHEI = - . 3 8 + 6.16 - + .84 (%AUEW) 
(.52) (2.11)*\l4.06)* 
R2 = .9212 DW = 2.44 
(t ratios in parenthèses; * significant at .05 levels)63. 
The équation indicates a strong link between union wage rates and the 
wages of the rest of the economy. Assuming union wages to be about 40% 
of total paid nonfarm wages this équation estimâtes the spillover at about 
.75 of the union wage change. 
However, there is at least some évidence that there is some resiliency to 
the structure and a gênerai force acting against an ever-increasing wage 
structure distortion process. Mitchell claims to hâve évidence that new set-
tlements tend to be smaller than predicted if the relative wage is above the 
accepted level and a little bigger if "out-of-line"64. Both Flanagan65 and 
Johnson66 in separate studies find that the spillover is from the nonunion 
sector to the union sector — thus supporting a wage trend argument that in-
flation cornes from the nonunion sector and that unions are essentially a 
response institution. 
4. It is important that we distinguish between unions when we consider 
how various groups fare in différent circumstances, particularly those of 
adversity. In particular, when priées are rising rapidly, a group that nego-
tiates a fully compensatory COLA contract cannot fail to draw away from 
groups which are not fully protected. We hâve seen a possibility that protec-
tion may reduce contracted increases, and that a "no-protection'' condition 
will resuit in some protection via contract increases. However, thèse are not 
fully offsetting conditions, and a period of rapid inflation undoubtedly 
leads to the COLA average providing fuller benefits. This seems to be an 
additional problem that rapid inflation générâtes, a condition which be-
63 Executive Office of the Président , op. cit., p p . 45-6. 
64 D . J . B . M I T C H E L L , " U n i o n Wage Déterminat ion: Policy Implications and Out-
l o o k " , Brookings Economie Papers on Economie Activity, 3 , 1978, p p . 567-8. 
65 R . J . F L A N A G A N , " W a g e Interdependence in Unionized Labor M a r k e t s " , Brook-
ings Papers on Economie Activity, 3, 1976. 
66 G .E . J O H N S O N , " T h e Déterminat ion of Wages in the Union and Nonun ion Sec-
t o r s " , British Journal of Industrial Relations, XV, 2, July 1977. 
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cornes increasingly acute because of the problem of relativity distortions 
which it carries into the subséquent recession — setting the stage for renew-
ed inflation when the economy moves upward again. 
As we look back over the years of writing on the rôle of unions in infla-
tion, it is obvious that our understanding of the wage process has increased. 
But there is still disagreement over even fundamental détails. What, for ex-
ample, is the précise distribution of the influences of unemployment, 
changes in unemployment, past price changes, expected price changes, rela-
tive wages on union and nonunion wages? How stable are thèse relation-
ships? Within the structures of union wage changes and of nonunion wage 
changes what factors détermine variations in thèse relationships? 
On this point we can return to the discussion between Wachter and 
Mitchell with which we began. In his article (1978) Mitchell has stressed the 
insensitivity of union wages to unemployment and to business conditions 
generally. Hence he expresses deep pessimism about the rôle of monetary/ 
fiscal policy in controlling inflation. Wachter, however, is optimistic. He is 
sure that union wages are sensitive to unemployment and to priées. Since 
priées respond to money supply then demand management should hâve no 
problem with controlling wage inflation. To Wachter the devil is the money 
supply, to Mitchell it is wages, both union and nonunion. To that extent at 
least we hâve not progressed much since the Friedman of 1951 and the 
Phelps Brown et al. of 1955. What rôle unions might hâve as political pres-
sure groups in determining the money supply is a separate issue. We hâve 
not looked at this aspect of unionism. Clearly in this respect unions, if they 
redistribute income at ail, are only part of a whole structure of pressure 
groups affecting monetary and budgetary processes, and hence indirectly 
the distribution of real income67. 
Les syndicats et l'inflation 
Il existe de grandes divergences de vues sur le rôle des syndicats dans l'inflation. 
À une extrémité, on trouve des auteurs comme Haberler, Joan Robinson, Phelps 
Brown, Hicks, James Meade et Hayek parmi les penseurs des générations passées et, 
plus près de nous Weintraub, Mitchell, Eckstein, Hines et Ashenfelter. Ceux-ci 
croient unanimement que l'influence des syndicats sur l'évolution des hausses de 
salaires est exogène. À l'opposé, il y a des auteurs comme Friedman parmi ceux qui 
ont abordé la question dans beaucoup de situations économiques diverses depuis la 
deuxième guerre mondiale et Wachter chez les économistes plus jeunes. Ces derniers 
67 This issue, though restricted to the United Kingdom, is discussed at length in John T. 
ADDISON, "Unions and Inflation", in Trade Unions and Society: Some Lessons from the 
British Expérience, Vancouver, B.C., The Fraser Institute, 1982. 
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ont tendance à considérer que les syndicats sont des institutions qui réagissent aux 
situations. Pour eux, l'inflation résulterait de politiques monétaires et fiscales qui 
sont incompatibles avec des prix stables. Les syndicats deviennent alors partie du 
contexte dans lequel ces politiques sécrètent leurs conséquences inflationnistes. 
La présente étude décrit le large éventail de points de vue que ces auteurs ont ex-
primés sur le rôle des syndicats en tant que responsable de l'inflation et sur leurs 
réactions vis-à-vis celle-ci. Un système de classification, qui a été suggéré par J.S. 
Trevithick et C. Mulvey dans The Economies of Inflation, y est utilisé pour diviser 
les auteurs par catégorie. D'une façon générale, la classification est restreinte à la 
réaction des syndicats aux diverses conditions de l'excès de la demande et aux consé-
quences qui en résultent sur le processus de l'inflation. 
L'étude s'efforce ensuite de décrire les moyens par lesquels les auteurs ont mesu-
ré le pouvoir des syndicats tel que cela est reflété dans les écarts salariaux entre syndi-
qués et non syndiqués. En premier lieu, elle explique les exposés dans lesquels on a 
utilisé un indice de dispersion des salaires pour mesurer cette dispersion parmi les 
gains moyens par industrie. Le but de ces exposés est d'identifier les tendances possi-
bles dans la dispersion des salaires de façon à relier indirectement chacune des ten-
dances que l'on a pu déceler là où elles étaient réglées par les syndicats. On y a trouvé 
une nette tendance à la hausse dans l'indice de dispersion, mais son rattachement au 
rôle des syndicats n'est pas satisfaisant. Un deuxième indice consiste dans une mesu-
re qui trace le rapport des gains industriels attribuables à l'importance de la syndica-
lisation en regard des gains horaires moyens dans le secteur privé non agricole. On 
n'observe aucune tendance marquée dans cette mesure, même si celle-ci montre des 
changements significatifs pour quelques sous-groupes de travailleurs. Au cours de la 
décennie 1970, l'expérience varie beaucoup: un diagramme illustrant le rapport des 
gains horaires moyens pour les industries sélectionnées en regard des gains privés non 
agricoles présente une étonnante diversité. Une troisième mesure décrit les change-
ments de salaires effectifs entre les salaires des travailleurs syndiqués et des travail-
leurs non syndiqués tels que catalogués par le Bureau des statistiques du travail dans 
son enquête sur le Current Wage Development. Celle-ci indique un avantage cons-
tant en faveur des travailleurs syndiqués. Des réserves doivent être apportées pour ce 
qui doit être mesuré par ces statistiques et pour la signification que l'on trouve dans 
des études récentes sur les caractéristiques exogènes ou endogènes des syndicats. 
Les études sur le militantisme des syndicats en tant qu'aspect distinct de leur rôle 
sont ensuite discutées et évaluées. On y découvre que Hines, Ashenfelter et autres de 
même que Swidinsky ont contribué d'une façon significative à ce débat, mais que 
leurs découvertes sont marquées par la préoccupation de ce qui est mesuré, par exem-
ple, la résistance des employeurs et le militantisme des syndicats d'une part et, d'au-
tre part, la réaction des membres et le militantisme des syndicats tels que décrits par 
Hines dans son travail originaire. 
L'article conclut par la discussion de ce que nous savons au sujet des rapports 
entre les syndicats et l'inflation. Il se termine sur une note sceptique. Malgré qu'un 
grand effort ait été déployé, on ignore même les données de base. Les grands problè-
mes d'identification restent encore à résoudre. 
